QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AS A SOLUTION FOR “CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES” IN COUNTRIES WITH ETHNIC DISPUTES. THE CASE OF KOSOVO

Abstract

As the title shows, this paper tries to answer the question of whether the reasons which are used for deviating from formal constitutional changes can also be related to ethnicity issues. Through a norm of a general constitutional nature, Kosovo has, through the constitution, included nonmajority communities in the process of amending the constitution, as a necessary element for creating the needed majority in order to go through with the amendment. This standard has led to several processes of amending the constitution having failed. The constitutional quasi-amendment, from what has been so far treated in constitutional theory and practice, has been seen as an opportunity to avoid formal constitutional changes for several different reasons. The authors who have dealt with the quasi-amendment distinguish some of the main reasons: the lack of political power to achieve the necessary majority for constitutional changes, the long procedural path of a constitutional amendment, especially in federal states, etc. The paper aims at bringing a study for a new reality, which highlights a new reason for using the constitutional quasi-amendment that has to do with countries where minority communities are involved in the process of constitutional changes. More specifically, this paper identifies the important role that the quasi-amendment plays in important changes of the constitutional structure, in cases where formal changes are blocked as a result of ethnic differences and disagreements. The constitutional quasi-amendment as treated by this paper has also found application in Kosovo, conditioned by the lack of a majority in the parliament for constitutional changes, circumstances which are conditioned by the ethnic factor that makes the procedures for changing the Kosovar constitution rigid.