ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS: LEGAL BOUNDARIES AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES

Simona Úlehlová*

Abstract: *This article explores the increasingly topical issue of using artificial intelligence (AI) in judicial proceedings from both a legal and practical perspective. Based on an analysis of European and Czech legislation, constitutional principles, and international examples, it identifies opportunities, but also significant risks related to the implementation of AI in judicial decision-making. Special attention is paid to issues of reviewability, accountability, judicial independence and equality of arms. The author proposes a set of de lege ferenda measures, including regulatory and ethical safeguards, and stresses the need to preserve human decision-making as a cornerstone of fair trial.*

Key words: *artificial intelligence, judicial digitalization, judicial decision-making, fair trial, AI act, algorithmic accountability, judicial independence*

INTRODUCTION

The digitalization of public administration and the judiciary is currently one of the key trends in the modernization of state institutions. In the field of justice, this development is gaining momentum due to increasing demands for efficiency, transparency, and accessibility of judicial proceedings, as well as in response to international pressures and legislative initiatives of the European Union. The digitalization of the judiciary is not limited to the transition from paper-based documents to electronic case files; it encompasses a broader range of innovations, including electronic communication, the automation of procedural acts, the use of big data, and, notably, the application of artificial intelligence (AI)[1] technologies.

Although the digitalization of justice is often presented as a tool to enhance the efficiency of judicial proceedings, shorten their duration, and reduce administrative burdens, it simultaneously raises a number of fundamental legal and ethical questions. With

* JUDr. Simona Úlehlová, Ph.D., Department of Civil Law, Faculty of Law, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. ORCID: 0009-0001-4502-2276.
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[1] The concept of artificial intelligence is often contested; however, for the purposes of this article, it encompasses automated computer programs capable of replacing or supplementing traditional judicial functions. Defined in this way, artificial intelligence may take an embodied form (such as robots) or operate without any specific physical presence, for example as algorithms. See RUSSELL, Stuart, NORVIG, Peter *Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. 3rd ed.* Upper Saddle River: Pearson, 2014. p. 2, where the authors set out eight definitions of artificial intelligence, distinguishing whether it is understood as "thinking humanly," "thinking rationally," "acting humanly," or "acting rationally." See also RE, Richard, SOLOW-NIEDERMAN, Aaron Developing Artificially Intelligent Justice. *Stanford Technology Law Review*. 2019, No. 2, pp. 242–301. For a systematic definition of artificial intelligence, reference may further be made to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonized rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and amending certain Union legislative acts (COM(2021) 206 final), which defines artificial intelligence as software that, for a given set of human-defined objectives, generates outputs such as content, predictions, recommendations, or decisions and influences the environment with which it interacts (Article 3(1)).

the growing use of algorithmic tools in the judiciary, concerns are emerging regarding the protection of the fundamental rights of the parties to the proceedings, the preservation of judicial independence and autonomy, the ability to ensure the reviewability of decisions, and adherence to the core constitutional principles of a democratic rule of law. Technological innovation thus exists in a state of tension between the objective of efficiency and the requirements of legitimacy and public trust in the judicial system.

The aim of this article is to analyze the legal framework and practical implications of the use of artificial intelligence in judicial proceedings, not only from the perspective of positive law, but also in light of constitutional discourse and the fundamental values underpinning the administration of justice. Particular attention is devoted to issues of liability for algorithmic decisions, the reviewability of AI system outputs, the constitutional requirement of a fair trial, and the limits of judicial autonomy in relation to technology-based decision-making. The author seeks to identify areas in which AI may serve as a supportive tool, while also highlighting the boundaries beyond which its deployment could be regarded as unconstitutional or incompatible with legal safeguards.

For the purposes of this study, artificial intelligence is understood as a technology that utilizes algorithmic models capable of analyzing input data, learning from it, and generating predictions or outputs that may influence or even replace human decision-making. In the context of the judiciary, AI tools can be divided into three main categories: **assistive systems** (e.g., legal research tools, predictive models, decision-drafting generators), **automated procedural tools** (e.g., electronic case allocation, scheduling, communication with parties), and **autonomous decision-making systems**, which are capable of issuing decisions in certain types of cases without the need for human intervention.[2,3] This distinction is analytically significant, as each of these forms raise distinct legal and constitutional implications.

Particular significance in this context is attributed to so-called predictive justice, that is, the use of AI to forecast the outcomes of legal disputes based on the analysis of historical data.[4] This trend, known particularly from the French and American contexts, raises not only methodological questions but, above all, value-based ones: can justice be founded on statistical probability?[5] Can an individual case be subjected to a model based on aggregated decision-making patterns? And if so, what does that mean for the role of the judge, their responsibility, and the perception of the judiciary as an interpretative activity?

In addition to theoretical reflection, the article also focuses on the analysis of relevant legal regulations, in particular the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the

[2] STOLPER, I. Towards Automated Decision-Making at Court: The Use of Artificial Intelligence for Drafting and Rendering Court Decisions. *Teisė. Vilnius University Press*. 2024, Vol. 130, pp. 153–163.

[3] In the legal literature, it is also possible to encounter a bipartite classification of systems into judge-supporting systems and fully automated decision-making, see e.g., KARPJÁKOVÁ, A. Fully Automated AI Systems and the Drafting of Reasoning in Civil Proceedings. *Právní rozhledy*, 2024, No. 22, p. 737. However, this division does not differentiate predictive systems from other supportive tools. Given the aim of this article, which seeks to analyze the benefits and limitations of individual categories, the author adopts a more detailed classification.

[4] LETOURNEAU, J. La justice prédictive: quelles limites pour quels usages? *Revue Lamy Droit de l'Immatériel*. 2019, No. 157, pp. 25–32.

[5] Similar also in PASQUALE, F. A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation. *George Washington Law Review*. 2019, Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 1–55.

Council on Artificial Intelligence (the so-called AI Act) and the recommendations of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice under the Council of Europe (CEPEJ)[6] and their impact on national legislation. Czech law has not yet explicitly addressed the issue of deploying AI in the judiciary, which creates the need to define the basic parameters of legal regulation de lege ferenda. This issue does not concern only technical details but also the broader concept of judicial power, its responsibility, and its relationship to other branches of the state and society.

The aim of this text is to contribute to the professional discussion on how (and whether at all) artificial intelligence can be integrated into the system of judicial decision-making in such a way that both the functional potential of these technologies and the constitutional and human rights limits–which are and must remain inviolable in a state governed by the rule of law–are preserved. Given that the digital transformation of justice is a process that does not take place in a vacuum but within a specific social and legal context, the article will examine not only legal norms and case law but also the institutional and cultural frameworks that influence how AI is perceived and implemented. Based on this analysis, the author formulates de lege ferenda proposals aimed at establishing a robust and value-based framework for the use of AI in the Czech judiciary.

I. LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE JUDICIARY

I.1. EU legislation and its impact on national regulation

The European Union takes a systematic approach to regulating artificial intelligence and has significantly intensified its legislative activity in this area in recent years. The key legislative instrument is the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonized rules for artificial intelligence and amending certain EU legislative acts, known as the Artificial Intelligence Act. The draft regulation, presented by the European Commission on 21 April 2021 (COM(2021) 206 final), represents the world's first comprehensive legal framework for regulating artificial intelligence. The regulation introduces a risk-based approach to the regulation of AI systems, based on assessing the degree to which they threaten fundamental rights and public interests. On this basis, systems are divided into four categories: prohibited practices, high-risk systems, limited-risk systems, and minimal-risk systems. AI tools intended for use in the exercise of judicial authority are classified as high-risk systems. In this category, particular emphasis is placed on ensuring the quality of input data, transparency towards the user, the presence of human oversight of the system's outputs, and the assurance of its technical reliability and cybersecurity.[7, 8]

[6] More to CEPEJ in: *Council of Europe* [online]. 27. 11. 2006 [2025-10-15]. Available at: <https://rm.coe.int/evropska-komise-pro-efektivitu-justice-european-commission-for-the-eff/1680747cbc>.

[7] This is also addressed by Article 8 and Article 10 of the Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the opening of negotiations on behalf of the European Union for a Council of Europe Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. Brussels: European Commission, 2022. COM (2022) 495 final.

[8] DEEKS, A. The judicial demand for explainable artificial intelligence. *Columbia Law Revue*. 2019, No. 7, pp. 1832–1833.

Particular attention in the context of the AI Act should be paid to Article 14, which systematically regulates the requirement of human oversight over high-risk AI systems. This Article, in several paragraphs, stipulates that providers of such systems are obliged to design and place on the market systems that enable effective human intervention during their operation. Article 14(4) further specifies the requirements imposed on persons entrusted with human oversight, stating that these persons must not only be able to interpret the system's outputs and understand its capabilities and limitations but, above all, to decide in a specific situation not to use the system, to disregard its output, or to cancel or override it altogether. They must also be able to interrupt or stop the operation of the system in a safe mode. From this interpretation of Article 14, it follows that the AI Act does not permit the use of high-risk systems in a way that would result in automated decision-making about the rights and obligations of natural persons without the possibility of human intervention. The obligation to ensure human oversight is not merely formal or supplementary but constitutes an essential condition for the lawful deployment of the system. The recitals to the regulation explicitly state that this requirement aims to prevent the phenomenon of so-called automation bias and to ensure that a human remains the subject responsible for the decision-making process at all times.[9] It can therefore be inferred that a decision generated by an AI-based system, over which there is no possibility of human reassessment, interpretation, or rejection, would be contrary not only to the wording of Article 14 but also to the overall purpose of the Regulation as defined in the recitals. Such a framework of human oversight is of key importance, especially in judicial decision-making, where any interference with an individual's legal sphere is subject to strict requirements of reviewability, accountability, and the possibility of corrective intervention.[10] From this perspective, Article 14 of the AI Act can be regarded as an expression of a legally binding requirement that excludes the introduction of purely automated decision-making processes without the possibility of human intervention, especially where a decision generated by artificial intelligence has a direct impact on the fundamental rights of an individual.[11] This position is based on the conviction that the human factor is irreplaceable in the administration of justice, particularly in interpreting legal norms, taking into account the individual circumstances of a case, and applying the principle of proportionality. After this regulation enters into force[12] as a legal act with direct effect, it will be necessary to review several areas in the Czech Republic. In particular, it will be essential to assess which planned AI systems in public administration and the judiciary fall into the category of high-risk systems. This will require adapting them to the requirements for user training, internal control mechanisms, documentation, and ensuring human oversight of decision outputs. At the institutional level, it will be necessary

[9] European Commission. Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonized rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act), COM(2021) 206 final, Brussels, 21 April 2021. Recitals 44, 50 and following. In: *European Commission* [online]. [2025-10-15]. Available at: <https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/CS/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0206>.

[10] Judgment of the Constitutional Court, file no. I. ÚS 4093/17, of 29 March 2018, or similarly also the judgment file no. IV. ÚS 3441/11, of 27 March 2012.

[11] For more, see AI Regulation, 2021, Recital, para. 5.2.3.

[12] Specifically, the parts concerning obligations for high-risk AI systems (including the commented Article 14), which are to enter into force only from 2 August 2026.

to designate an authority responsible for supervising compliance with the obligations under the AI Act, and it can be expected that this role will be fulfilled by the Office for Personal Data Protection in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice. At the procedural level, it may be necessary to amend the relevant procedural regulations to reflect the new requirements on informing parties to the proceedings about the use of artificial intelligence and their right to human review of algorithmically generated decisions.

In addition to binding European Union legislation, soft law also plays a role in this area. A particularly important document is the Ethical Charter on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Judicial Systems, adopted by the CEPEJ in 2018.[13] Although this Charter is not legally binding, it sets out five fundamental principles that should be observed when introducing artificial intelligence into the judiciary: respect for fundamental rights, prohibition of discrimination, quality and security of systems, transparency and explainability, and finally the principle of human oversight. Similar principles are also established in the Council Decision authorizing the opening of negotiations on behalf of the European Union on the Council of Europe Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law.[14]

It can be concluded that European legislation is aimed at establishing clear rules for the safe, fair, and responsible use of artificial intelligence in the field of justice. Czech law should reflect these principles not only at the level of specific laws and secondary regulations but also within the organization of the judiciary and the professional responsibility of judges when using technologies incorporating elements of artificial intelligence.

I.2. Czech legal framework

There is currently no specific legal regulation in Czech law that explicitly addresses the use of artificial intelligence in the judiciary. So far, procedural rules play the most important role in this area. In civil justice, the Code of Civil Procedure regulates the fundamental principles of conducting civil proceedings and allows the use of certain electronic tools, such as electronic filings, electronic service of documents, or the use of videoconferencing equipment. In connection with the broader digitalization of public administration, an important piece of legislation is Act No. 12/2020 Sb., on the Right to Digital Services. This Act establishes the general right of every citizen to communicate digitally with public authorities and at the same time the Act imposes an obligation on these authorities to adapt their activities to enable such digital communication. An exception to this general obligation is made for specific areas, including the exercise of judicial power. This exception reflects the constitutional principle of the independence of the courts

[13] European Ethical Charter on the use of Artificial Intelligence in judicial systems and their environment (4. 12. 2018), European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

[14] European Commission**.** Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the opening of negotiations on behalf of the European Union for a Council of Europe Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. Brussels: European Commission, 2022. COM(2022) 495 final. In: *European Commission* [online]. [2025-10-15]. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52022PC0414>. This is a recommendation for a Council decision authorizing the opening of negotiations on behalf of the European Union for what would be the first legally binding international treaty on artificial intelligence in the world. The proposed convention aims to establish common standards for governing AI based on human rights, democratic values, and the principles of the rule of law.

(Article 82 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic) and highlights the fact that the judiciary is subject to a special regime ensuring its independence and impartiality. In practice, this means that although courts can and already do partially use digital tools (for example, through the eJustice portal or the data mailbox information system), their use is not governed by a unified legal concept that takes into account the specifics of AI. The use of algorithmic tools in decision-making is not legally regulated, and their introduction would require not only special legislation but also an assessment of their compliance with constitutional requirements, especially if they were to be autonomous or quasi-autonomous decision-making systems. The absence of legal regulation is not only a legislative problem but also has practical consequences. Without clearly defined rules, judges and court administration lack support for implementing new technologies, and the question of liability for potential system errors that could affect the outcome of proceedings remains unresolved.[15] In the future, it will be necessary to establish a legal basis for the use of artificial intelligence in the judiciary and to create a framework that allows its use under precisely defined conditions. This framework should include both a guarantee of maintaining human oversight and requirements for transparency, reviewability, and the protection of the fundamental rights of the parties to the proceedings.

II. PRACTICAL USE OF AI IN JUDICIAL PRACTICE

A prerequisite for effective civil proceedings is an appropriate setup of the digitalization of justice, which does not consist merely in filing an application to initiate proceedings via remote access using an electronic form, but also in the fact that all, or almost all, subsequent actions of the court will be carried out in digital form.[16] The impact of modern technologies and methods on civil proceedings manifests itself on several levels. A more detailed examination makes it possible to identify specific ways in which the emergence of new technologies and knowledge, including the use of artificial intelligence, is reflected in these proceedings.[17] From a systematic perspective, the introduction of artificial intelligence into judicial proceedings can be understood as the logical culmination of the entire process of digitalizing justice. It is only when the key elements of digitalization, particularly digital claims,[18] the electronic court file, and the possibility of online access to it, are fully operational that the introduction of AI tools could be considered a natural and systematically justified step. Given the current state of the digitalization of the Czech judiciary, where even the above-mentioned elements have not yet been implemented, it cannot be ruled out that the use of AI tools will precede the completion of these basic

[15] ZALNIERIUTE, M., BELL, F. Technology and Judicial Role. In: Gabrielle Appleby - Andrew Lynch (eds.). *The Judge and the Court: Individual, Collegial and Institutional Judicial Dynamics in Australia.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021, pp. 116–141.

[16] SEDLÁČEK, M. National Report on Automation in Decision-Making in Civil Procedure in the Czech Republic. *Acta Universitatis Carolinae Iuridica.* 2024, No. 2, pp. 159–169.

[17] SEDLÁČEK, M. Automation in Civil Court Decision-Making – Possibility or Necessity? In: Renáta Bačárová – Tobiáš Pacák – Michaela Szittyaiová (eds.). *Košice Days of Private Law V. Peer-Reviewed Collection of Scientific Papers.* Košice: Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice, Faculty of Law, 2024, pp. 210–217.

[18] For more on digital lawsuits, see STŘELEČEK, T. Reflections on the Digital Lawsuit. *Právní rozhledy.* 2024, Vol. 32, No. 17, pp. 556–561.

digitalization steps. In fact, it is realistic to expect that artificial intelligence will, in the near future, be deployed by individual judges in ad hoc cases than as a universally codified and centralized solution embedded in the legal framework. This inconsistency raises the question of what specific forms and applications of artificial intelligence are actually being used in judicial practice and what their purpose is. I will attempt to answer this question in the following paragraphs.

II.1. Typology of applications

The possibilities for using artificial intelligence in the judiciary can be divided into several categories according to the nature and purpose of the technologies in question. One of the most widespread forms are so-called assistive tools, which are intended to support the judge in the decision-making process rather than to replace them.[19] These tools include, for example, case law analysis systems that enable faster retrieval of relevant decisions, identification of legal principles, or statistical analysis of the decision-making practice in a particular type of cases. In this way, judges gain an effective means to navigate the ever-increasing volume of case law, which can help improve the quality and consistency of their decisions.

Another type consists of predictive tools, which, based on extensive databases of past decisions, create models capable of estimating the likely outcome of a particular dispute.[20]

However, their use raises questions related to the risk of formalizing decision-making and the danger that a judge may be internally motivated to follow the *likely outcome* instead of individually assessing the specific case.[21]

Special attention should be given to the most widely discussed systems, those for automated generation of draft decisions, which are capable of producing a draft reasoning of a decision based on input data and predefined templates. This way of using artificial intelligence can significantly streamline the administrative work of courts, especially in repetitive and legally straightforward cases.[22] These are primarily disputes that can be decided without a hearing. In such cases, the greatest potential use of decision-making algorithms can currently be seen, where form-based decisions could be considered on the basis of predefined input criteria and legal templates.[23] An example of efforts to

[19] Examples of AI-based assistance tools include, for instance, ROSS Intelligence or the integrated AI features in Westlaw Edge and Lexis+ in the United States, which enable natural language case law research and predictive analytics. In Canada, the tool Blue J Legal has become widespread; it estimates the outcome of a dispute based on the facts provided. In the United Kingdom, the CaseCrunch tool was tested and achieved a higher success rate than lawyers in predicting decisions of the Financial Ombudsman. In the European Union, research and pilot projects such as AI4Justice or KEI (Netherlands) are underway, focusing on the digitization and analysis of court decisions. In France, the platform Doctrine.fr allows, among other things, the monitoring of individual judges' decision-making practices, which in 2019 led to the adoption of a ban on publishing statistics relating to specific judges in order to protect their independence.

[20] See footnote 3.

[21] YEUNG, Karen Algorithmic Regulation: A Critical Interrogation. *Regulation & Governance.* 2018 [2025-06-15]. Available at: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12158>.

[22] COFONE, Ignacio N. AI and Judicial Decision-Making. In: Florian Martin-Barteau – Teresa Scassa (eds.). *Artificial Intelligence and the Law in Canada.* Toronto: LexisNexis, 2021.

[23] CANE, P. Automated Decision-Making and Administrative Law. In: Peter Cane (ed.). et al. *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Administrative Law.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.

apply automated decision-making in practice is a pilot project implemented in Estonia. The Estonian Ministry of Justice, in cooperation with the Estonian Centre of Registers and Information Systems (RIK), tested a system designed for the automated resolution of so-called small claims, specifically consumer claims up to 7,000 EUR. These mainly concerned the recovery of unpaid invoices and other monetary obligations.[24] The parties had the opportunity to upload the necessary documents through an online interface, after which the system evaluated compliance with the legal requirements based on predefined rules and generated a draft decision. This draft could then be subjected to human review, which strengthened the guarantees of a fair trial.[25] It was therefore not an application of artificial intelligence in the narrow sense of the word, but rather algorithmic automation of form-based decision-making, which nevertheless opens an important debate about the possibilities and limits of machine decision-making in the field of civil law. Although this model can bring significant time and cost savings, its introduction into the legal system requires thorough evaluation of legal and ethical risks, particularly with regard to the right to a fair trial and the possibility of appeal.[26]

In addition to the above, it is also necessary to mention tools that use artificial intelligence in procedural management and court administration. These include, for example, systems for electronic allocation of cases according to set rules, tools for managing hearing schedules, or systems enabling automated communication with parties to proceedings via chatbots. These applications reduce the administrative burden on the court apparatus and contribute to greater efficiency of the entire institution, while not affecting substantive decision-making.

The use of artificial intelligence in the judiciary can take various forms, ranging from supporting decision-making activities to automating procedural steps and even partial decision-making functions. Each of these forms entails different requirements for legal regulation, institutional safeguards, and the degree of acceptance by both users and the public.

II.2. Benefits and limitations of AI in practice

The introduction of artificial intelligence into judicial practice is associated with a number of promising expectations, among which the most prominent are the acceleration of the decision-making process, the reduction of administrative burden, and the overall rationalization of the operation of judicial institutions. Thanks to the deployment of intelligent tools, many procedural tasks that are currently time and resource-intensive can be made significantly more efficient. A typical example includes electronic categorization of case files, optimization of hearing schedules, or assistance with legal research tools falling within the first two categories discussed above. In these cases, artificial intelligence

[24] LIMANTE, A., SUKYTE, M. Comparative insights and future directions of AI in the courts of the Baltic States. *International Journal of Law and Information Technology.* 2025, Vol. 33.

[25] Ibid.

[26] This requirement also arises from Article 14 of the Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the opening of negotiations on behalf of the European Union for a Council of Europe Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. Brussels: European Commission, 2022. COM(2022) 495 final.

does not enter into the decision-making process itself but provides substantial support to judges in carrying out their everyday tasks.

In the future, the predictive tools mentioned above may be particularly beneficial, as they enable judges to better estimate the development of a dispute or to identify decision-making trends in similar cases.[27] Although judges are not formally bound by these predictions, the system can provide them with feedback or alert them to potential pitfalls in their decision-making. Such an approach can contribute to greater consistency in decision-making practice and thereby strengthen the legal certainty of the parties to the proceedings.[28] However, a limitation of these support tools is the fact that the outputs provided by predictive or research systems may be incomplete or misleading.[29] These tools operate using the data they have been provided with, and their algorithms generate only a certain segment of possible conclusions, which can suggest specific interpretations to the judge or overlook less frequent but still relevant decisions.[30] This creates a risk of so-called tunnel vision, where the decision-making process is indirectly influenced by the selective pre-selection and presentation of data. It is therefore essential that even these tools, which at first glance may appear purely supportive and not formally involved in the judge's actual decision-making activity, are subjected to systematic and critical evaluation by the human user, in terms of their comprehensiveness and their relevance to the specific legal questions.

Artificial intelligence also offers the potential to improve access to information both for the judicial apparatus and for the parties to the proceedings themselves. For example, chatbots or electronic information interfaces can help citizens navigate procedural issues, alert them to deficiencies in their submissions, or explain the structure of court proceedings. This increases transparency and reduces information asymmetry between the parties and the court.[31] On the other hand however, the use of these tools can also lead to the opposite effect–an imbalance between the parties to the proceedings–if they are effectively used only by one party, while the other, for example due to digital illiteracy or their social situation, does not have this possibility. In such cases, there is a risk of undermining the principle of equality of arms, which is one of the fundamental pillars of a fair trial. Differences in access to information could ultimately lead to a de facto

[27] HILDEBRANDT, M. Algorithmic Regulation and the Rule of Law. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. In: *The Royal Society Publishing* [online]. 2018 [2025-06-15]. Available at: <https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/epdf/10.1098/rsta.2017.0355>.

[28] On the requirement of consistency in case law, see ŠIMÍČEK, V. *Constitutional Complaint. 3rd edition.* Prague: Linde, 2005, p. 293.

[29] As an example, reference can be made to a 2016 study by University College London, in which experts concluded that a machine learning-based system was able to predict the final judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights with an accuracy of 79 %. Cf. ALETRAS, N., TSARAPATSANIS, D. et al. Predicting judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: a Natural Language Processing perspective. In: *PeerJ Publishing* [online]. 24. 10. 2016 [2025-10-15]. Available at: https://peerj.com/; KARPJÁKOVÁ, A. *Fully Automated AI Systems and the Drafting of Reasoning in Civil Proceedings*, p. 737.

[30] HASSANI, H., SILVA, E. S. The Role of ChatGPT in Data Science: How AI-Assisted Conversational Interfaces are revolutionizing the filed. *Big Data and Cognitive Computing*. 2023, Vol. 7, No. 2.

[31] ÚLEHLOVÁ, S. The Discovery Instrument and Czech Civil Procedure: The Path to More Effective Evidence-Taking? *Jurisprudence*. 2025, Vol. 2, pp. 25–31 [2025-10-15]. Available at: <https://www.jurisprudence.cz/cz/casopis/institut-discovery-a-ceske-civilni-rizeni-cesta-k-efektivnejsimu-dokazovani.m-901.html>.

weakening of the procedural position of one of the parties. A possible solution in such situations could be the use of the institution appointing a representative under Section 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure,[32] not only in cases of obvious indigence but also where the fair position of a participant would otherwise be jeopardized due to technological disadvantage. Such an interpretation would be consistent with a constitutionally compliant understanding of access to justice and would reflect the new challenges brought about by the digitalization of the judiciary.

In connection with the third area mentioned–tools involved in decision-making activities, whether in the reasoning or in generating the decisions themselves–it is necessary to highlight the most fundamental limitation, which is the fact that artificial intelligence (at least in its current form) is not capable of interpreting legal norms within their axiological context.[33] While a human is able to take into account broader social contexts, the moral aspects of a case, or exceptional circumstances, machine algorithms generally operate based on statistical patterns and past decisions, thereby risking the formalization of justice.[34] As stated in the National Report on the Automation of Decision-Making in Civil Proceedings in the Czech Republic, in connection with artificial intelligence we should rather focus on the question of whether machines are capable of achieving decision-making outcomes comparable to or even better than those of a human judge, not by imitating human thinking, but thanks to their own technical advantages, such as high computing power, the ability to work with large volumes of data, and the use of advanced algorithms.[35] This raises several key questions that define the limits of these tools. The National Report distinguishes three main questions. The first asks whether machines can think, decide, create, or reason like humans; according to the National Report, the answer is negative, because the human judge remains irreplaceable in their ability to understand and balance the value-based and human aspects of a case. The second question is whether machines can produce decisions with reasoning. In view of technological developments, it is not entirely inconceivable that in a few decades systems will emerge that are capable of formulating decisions at the level of the best judicial outputs, even though their author will not be a human but an algorithm. The third question concerns the possibility of creating tools that, although operating differently than humans, would generate similar social and economic outcomes as traditional courts. This idea appears to be the most realistic and is naturally connected to the field of machine learning and predictive analysis of decision-making practice.[36]

As a possible solution to the above described limitations, consideration could be given to introducing so-called assisted or fully automated decision-making modalities, which would be legally codified for a predetermined set of cases, for example, disputes over

[32] Act No. 99/1963 Sb., Code of Civil Procedure.

[33] Reflections on the fact that AI tools are not merely a technology but are also capable of making value-laden decisions are elaborated by Mireille Hildebrandt in her work Algorithmic Regulation and the Rule of Law. See HILDEBRANDT M. *Algorithmic Regulation and the Rule of Law. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society.*

[34] COGLIANESE, C., BEN DOR, L. M. AI in Adjudication and Administration. *Brooklyn Law Review.* 2021, Vol. 3, p. 761.

[35] SEDLÁČEK, M. *National Report on Automation in Decision-Making in Civil Procedure in the Czech Republic,* pp. 159–169.

[36] Ibid.

monetary claims up to a certain amount, or in the case of form-based claims that are repetitive in nature and do not require more complex legal or factual reasoning. In this respect, it could be considered to introduce an opt-in or opt-out model, under which the claimant (or another procedural party) would have the option to decide whether they prefer standard judicial decision-making or, conversely, to use expedited proceedings in which the decision would be generated by an AI tool.[37] In the first case, the system would generate a draft decision that would be subject to final approval by the judge, thereby complying with Article 14 of the AI Act, which prohibits fully autonomous decision-making without human oversight. In the second option, it would be a fully automated decision that would have the effect of a judicial ruling, but there would always have to be the possibility of appellate review before an independent (human) court. This review would serve as a key guarantee for protecting the rights of the parties to the proceedings and would at the same time fulfil the requirements for human oversight of the decision-making process as laid down in Article 14 of the AI Act. To increase the incentive to use this form of decision-making, claimants could be offered a benefit, and a suitable proposal would be to introduce a lower court fee, similar to the current arrangement for electronic payment orders.[38] A system designed in this way could represent a reasonable compromise between procedural efficiency and the preservation of fundamental procedural safeguards, with the decision on whether an AI tool should be used to resolve the dispute resting with the claimant. However, it appears essential in this context that the decision itself was generated (whether or not it was reviewed by a judge) should always be clearly stated in the decision itself.[39]

In this context, it is also necessary to mention the issue of the black box effect. In the case of more complex models, especially those based on deep learning, the output of the system is often difficult to interpret, and it is not entirely clear which algorithmic process led to a particular decision.[40] If a decision is issued by a tool using artificial intelligence, the lack of transparency regarding how the tool decided and what considerations it

[37] According to Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR), there are two key principles governing automated decision-making. Individuals have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing unless such decision-making is authorized by Union law or unless the data subject has given their explicit consent to be subject to it (GDPR, Article 22(2)). If, in the accelerated procedure, a decision was to be generated by an artificial intelligence tool without any human involvement, it would therefore be necessary for the individual concerned to actively and explicitly consent to such a process. In other words, in line with this legislation, it would likely be limited to an opt-in model. The Regulation further requires that the possibility of human intervention in the decision and the possibility to contest the decision be ensured (GDPR, Article 22(3)).

[38] Roundtable on the Digitalization of Justice and Online Courts in the Czech Republic. In: *Czech Bar Association* [online]. 13. 6. 2022 [2025-10-15]. Available at: <https://advokatnidenik.cz/2022/06/14/paty-kulaty-stul-k-digitalizaci-justice-se-venoval-agendam-i-spusteni-systemu/>.

[39] Corresponding requirement also arises from Article 15 of the Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the opening of negotiations on behalf of the European Union for a Council of Europe Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. Brussels: European Commission, 2022. COM(2022) 495 final.

[40] RE, R. M., SOLOW-NIEDERMAN, A. Developing Artificially Intelligent Justice. *Stanford Technology Law Review.* 2019, Vol. 22, p. 242.

followed is contrary to the requirement of clarity and reviewability of the decision, which are fundamental attributes of a fair trial.[41] Moreover, the court's obligation to ensure that its decision and the reasoning behind it is convincing and comprehensible arises directly from the law.[42] The issue of data quality also remains a critical area. AI systems are only as reliable as the data on which they were trained. If the data contains historical biases, systematic distortions, or fails to reflect social changes, this bias can also be transferred into the decision-making process and, for example, lead to discriminatory outcomes.[43] This is particularly dangerous in sensitive areas such as family or criminal law decision-making. The use of artificial intelligence also carries the risk of undermining public trust in the justice system.[44] If the parties to the proceedings do not understand how and why the decision was made, or if they gain the impression that their case was decided by a *machine* without sufficient consideration of their individual circumstances, this can lead to questioning the legitimacy of the judicial system as a whole. This issue is particularly important in a democratic state governed by the rule of law, where the judiciary is built on public trust in its impartiality, expertise, and humanity. Addressing this problem is the focus of current research activities in the field of so-called explainable AI (xAI), which aim to develop systems capable of making the logic of their conclusions or predictions accessible and rendering the decision-making process of machine learning algorithms more transparent and understandable to humans.[45]

For these reasons, the use of artificial intelligence in the judiciary should be viewed not merely through the lens of technical innovation but above all as a question of values and institutional design. Artificial intelligence can be an excellent assistant, but it should never replace responsible human decision-making, which is the foundation of a fair trial. It is essential that any deployment of AI be framed by robust legal and ethical safeguards that ensure a balance between efficiency and the legitimate authority of judicial decisions.

This is also related to the question of legal liability for decisions influenced or generated by artificial intelligence systems, which represents one of the key challenges that needs to be addressed in connection with their use in the field of justice. The fundamental principle of both Czech and European law is that responsibility for a judicial decision lies with the judge who issues it.[46] This principle is closely linked to the concept

[41] See more CHANG, C. The First Global AI Treaty: Analyzing the Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. *University of Illinois Law Review Online*. In: *illinoislawreview.org* [online]. 2024 [2025-06-15]. Available at: <https://illinoislawreview.org>.

[42] Cf. Section 157(2) of the Czech Code of Civil Procedure.

[43] STOLPER, I. *Towards Automated Decision-Making at Court: The Use of Artificial Intelligence for Drafting and Rendering Court Decisions*, pp. 153–163.

[44] This is also addressed by Article 10 of the Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the opening of negotiations on behalf of the European Union for a Council of Europe Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. Brussels: European Commission, 2022. COM(2022) 495 final.

[45] KARPJÁKOVÁ, A. *Fully Automated AI Systems and the Drafting of Judicial Reasoning in Civil Procedure,* p. 739.

[46] A judge is procedurally and professionally responsible for the legality and reasoning of their decision and decides on the basis of their own authority. However, if damage is caused by a judicial decision, the primary liability rests with the state under Act No. 82/1998 Sb., on Liability for Damage Caused in the Exercise of Public Authority. The entitled person therefore asserts their claim directly against the state, not against the individual judge. Only in cases where the judge has caused the damage intentionally or through gross negligence may the state, under Section 17 of the same Act, seek recourse compensation from the judge.

of the independence of the judiciary and the personal responsibility of the judge for the administration of justice. If the judge uses artificial intelligence merely as a supportive tool in decision-making, then responsibility for the final decision remains solely with the judge, just as it does when an assistant is involved[47] or another expert basis. The situation becomes more complex if a decision were to be made entirely autonomously by an AI-based tool without any human intervention. If such a tool were introduced, the question would arise as to who, and in what manner, would bear legal responsibility for any error, harm to the rights of the parties to the proceedings, or even a violation of constitutionally guaranteed procedural safeguards. This raises the question of whether liability would rest with the state as the operator of the system, the technology provider who created and *trained* the system, or the specific justice employee who was supposed to supervise its use.

III. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ALGORITHMIC DELEGATION

Judicial independence is one of the cornerstones of the constitutional system of the Czech Republic. According to Article 81 of the Constitution, judicial power is exercised independently.[48] This principle is further developed in Article 82, which enshrines the independence of judges and their obligation to be bound only by the law. In this context, the question of using artificial intelligence in the judiciary is a very sensitive issue, as any intervention in the decision-making process can be perceived as a potential infringement of this independence.

If an algorithmic system were used to make decisions instead of the judge, especially without the possibility of correction, modification, or rejection by a human actor, it could in effect mean transferring part of the decision-making power outside the judiciary. Such a situation would be hardly compatible with the idea of the judiciary as an independent power because it would undermine the exclusive role of the judge as the guarantor of legality, impartiality, and justice.

A decision could then become the result of a technical computation rather than an individual, considered, and responsible assessment of all the circumstances of the case. Moreover, this would open the door to so-called algorithmic delegation of authority, in which the power to decide would effectively shift, behind the scenes, to the creators or operators of the algorithm. The system might outwardly appear to be a *neutral* tool, but in reality, the decisive weight would lie in its code, data set, and training methodology. This would amount to the de facto externalization of a judicial judgment, something that is incompatible with the constitutional framework of judicial power.

A further limitation of using artificial intelligence tools is the excessive formalization of the decision-making process. If the output of an algorithm were regarded as the starting point or decisive basis of a judicial decision, the ability to reflect the individual circumstances of a specific case could be suppressed. As a result, the decision could lose its value-based context and become an *average* outcome corresponding to an

[47] Unless it is a decision issued in the name of a judicial assistant.
[48] Constitutional Act No. 1/1993 Sb., Constitution of the Czech Republic, Article 81.

aggregated picture drawn from past data, rather than a fair response to the unique situation. In a state governed by the rule of law, it is not only about speed and efficiency but also about proportionality, humanity, and the dignity of the process values that cannot be simulated algorithmically.

It is essential to recognize that a human judge does not serve only as a decision-making unit but also acts as an ethical and value-based corrective. The judge alone is capable of recognizing when the application of a legal norm in a particular form leads to an unjust outcome and can seek solutions that are in accordance not only with the letter but also with the spirit of the law. From this it follows that any deployment of artificial intelligence in the area of decision-making must respect the constitutional limits of judicial independence. AI can be a useful assistant in supportive and routine activities, but not a tool that replaces the role of the judge as the final arbiter of justice.

In light of these considerations, the integration of AI into the judiciary must be approached with extraordinary caution and always with an emphasis on preserving the personal responsibility and sovereign judgment of the judge as the foundation of the legitimate authority to decide.

IV. SUMMARY OF SELECTED COUNTRIES' APPROACHES TO THE USE OF AI IN THE JUDICIARY

The Estonian project mentioned above is not unique in the global context; therefore, this section presents the approaches of selected countries whose experiences with the use of artificial intelligence in the judiciary can serve as inspiration for the further direction of the Czech judiciary in this area. At the European level, advanced projects can also be found in France and the United Kingdom. The French Republic has adopted a notably restrictive approach to the use of artificial intelligence in the judiciary, reflecting primarily ethical and institutional concerns related to the potential misuse of data analysis. In 2019, France enacted Law No. 2019-222 of 23 March 2019 on the Implementation of Justice Programming for the Period 2018–2022, which, among other provisions, prohibits the use of statistical tools to analyze the decision-making activities of individual judges. Specifically, Article 33 of this law states that any disclosure, dissemination, or reuse of data allowing the identification of judges in connection with their decision-making activities for the purpose of evaluating, comparing, or predicting their decisions is prohibited.[49] Violation of this prohibition is punishable by up to five years of imprisonment and a fine.[50] The purpose of this measure is to protect the independence of the judiciary, prevent pressure on individual judges, and prevent the creation of databases that could be used for commercial or political influence over judicial power. This legislative intervention was a response to the growing popularity of predictive legal tools that used large volumes of anonymized court decisions to model the likely development of disputes. Although these tools can be useful, for example, for legal practice or research purposes, concerns

[49] In: *Légifrance* [online]. 25. 3. 2019 [2025-10-16]. Available at: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/article_lc/LEGIARTI000038262636/>.
[50] Ibid.

about their potential misuse for creating *judge rankings* or exerting pressure on judicial decision-making prevailed in France.[51] The French approach thus demonstrates that the digitalization of justice is not merely a technical issue but primarily a matter of values. The protection of judicial independence and public trust in the judiciary has been given priority here over the potential benefits of predictive analysis. This model can serve as an inspiration, especially in debates about the limits of transparency and whether the full opening of judicial data might paradoxically lead to a weakening of judicial autonomy.

The United Kingdom takes a pragmatic approach to the use of artificial intelligence in the field of justice, adhering to the principle of *human in the loop*, which ensures the consistent preservation of the human decision-making element.[52] This approach means that even in cases where an algorithmic system is used in the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, a human is always present who has the ability to confirm, modify, or completely reject the system's output. In the UK legal environment, AI is most commonly used in the administrative area of justice, such as case management, file allocation, or scheduling hearings. Beyond the judiciary itself, algorithms are also applied within the broader justice apparatus, particularly in prisons and criminal justice.[53] The experience of the United Kingdom is valuable primarily because it demonstrates how technology can be used as a supportive tool without delegating decision-making authority to a machine. The *human in the loop* model provides a practical framework for the ethical use of AI that respects the principles of responsible decision-making, accountability, and the protection of the rights of parties to the proceedings.

Looking across the ocean, among the countries that approach the regulation of algorithmic systems in public administration systematically and transparently, Canada cannot be overlooked. In 2019, the Canadian government introduced a tool called the Algorithmic Impact Assessment (AIA), designed to assess the impacts of algorithmic decision-making systems before their implementation in practice.[54] This approach represents an innovative combination of preventive regulation, ethical assessment, and public participation. The AIA is a mandatory process for all federal institutions seeking to implement systems that use automated decision-making. The assessment focuses on four main areas: the impact on individual rights, system transparency, data quality and integrity, and the implementation of accountability mechanisms.[55] Based on these criteria, the system is classified into one of four risk categories, with stricter requirements imposed on systems with higher risk levels. The AIA also requires the publication of an assessment report, which promotes

[51] FOUREL, E., RAHMANI. Y. *Reuse of Judges' Identity Data: What Future for Predictive Justice? The French Judge Facing Legaltech*. Paris: Droit & Croissance, 2020.

[52] Ministry of Justice – Exploring use of large language models for semi-automation of criminal justice reports. TIN-MOJ-003. London. Internship announcement. In: *The Alan Turing Institute* [online]. 2024 [2025-10-16]. Available at: https://www.turing.ac.uk/.

[53] Ibid.

[54] CANE, P. Automated Decision-Making and Administrative Law. In: Peter Cane – Leighton Cunynghame – Michael Kirby – Christopher McCrudden (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Administrative Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.

[55] Algorithmic Impact Assessment Tool. In: *The Government of Canada* [online]. 2019 [2025-10-16]. Available at: <https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/digital-government-innovations/responsible-use-ai/algorithmic-impact-assessment.html>.

public oversight and trust in the fair functioning of the state.[56] The Canadian approach is valuable in that it links technological innovation with the principles of responsible governance, including accountability, public participation, and an emphasis on human rights. Although the AIA does not directly cover judicial power, it demonstrates a way in which similar assessments could be applied to algorithms used in the judiciary, such as in case management or preliminary dispute evaluation. Canada thus offers an inspiring example for EU Member States considering how to regulate AI in the public sector in a manner consistent with democratic values and the legal protections of citizens.[57]

The presented foreign examples demonstrate a diversity of approaches to the use of artificial intelligence in the judicial field, each reflecting the specific cultural, institutional, and value frameworks of the respective country. Estonia represents a progressive technological experiment that nevertheless does not overlook the necessity of human review and the preservation of procedural safeguards. France has adopted a more defensive stance, protecting judicial independence even at the cost of limiting technological possibilities, emphasizing the value of trust and protection against the commercialization of justice. The United Kingdom has chosen pragmatism and institutional caution through the *human in the loop* model, where technology supports but does not replace human decision-making. Canada offers a valuable example of institutionally anchored preventive oversight aimed at ensuring responsible implementation of algorithmic systems before their actual deployment.

These approaches provide important insights for the Czech debate as well. A common denominator of all four models is the recognition of the importance of the human element in judicial decision-making and the necessity of institutional safeguards to prevent both soulless automated justice and uncontrolled invasion of technological tools into decision-making processes. The experiences of these countries confirm that technological progress is compatible with the rule of law only when accompanied by a legal framework, responsible governance, and consistent respect for fundamental rights.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of the legal framework, constitutional foundations, and practical experiences with the use of artificial intelligence in the judiciary reveals several key findings that should guide further expert and legislative discussions in the Czech Republic. It is clear that artificial intelligence offers real opportunities to increase efficiency, reduce administrative burdens, and improve access to justice in judicial practice. At the same time, however, serious risks cannot be overlooked–particularly those related to interference with judicial independence, the interpretation of law, and the protection of fundamental procedural rights of the parties involved.

Above all, it must be emphasized that the introduction of AI into judicial decision-making is not merely a technical issue but one of profound value significance. The constitu-

[56] Ibid.

[57] COFONE, Ignacio N. AI and Judicial Decision-Making. In: Florian Martin-Barteau – Teresa Scassa (eds.). *Artificial Intelligence and the Law in Canada.*

tional framework of the Czech Republic,[58] as well as obligations arising from international treaties,[59] is founded on the personal responsibility of the judge, the right to a lawful and independent judge, and the reviewability of judicial decisions. These principles mean that no algorithm, regardless of how advanced, can replace human decision-making in substantive matters without undermining the very essence of judicial power. Decision-making in judicial proceedings is not merely a process of applying predetermined rules but also involves interpretation, discretion, and value-based assessment capabilities that algorithmic systems are currently unable to fully replicate.

The current Czech legal framework is not prepared for the use of AI in the judiciary. There is a lack of both explicit legal regulation and methodological and ethical standards that would define the boundaries within which AI tools can be introduced into judicial decision-making practices. Although the use of electronic tools is already common today (such as e-filings, data boxes, electronic case files), these tools serve purely procedural and technical-administrative functions.

In light of emerging efforts to introduce more advanced forms of AI, it is necessary to actively formulate a legal framework that clearly defines these tools and limits their use to areas that do not threaten the fundamental pillars of the judiciary. It is essential to distinguish between the use of AI for supportive purposes (analytical tools, organizational software, predictive models) and its potential use in the actual decision-making act, where a clear boundary must be set to safeguard the inviolability of human judgment.

From the perspective of de lege ferenda considerations, it is necessary not only to supplement procedural rules with explicit conditions for the use of artificial intelligence in judicial proceedings but also to create a special legal framework that would define the principles of using algorithmic tools in the judiciary. This framework should be based on the principles of transparency, accountability, proportionality, and reviewability. Every algorithm involved in the decision-making process must be sufficiently documented, and mechanisms must exist that allow verification of its functioning not only by the judges themselves but also by the parties to the proceedings and, where applicable, appellate bodies.

Otherwise, there is a risk not only of losing the legitimacy of judicial decisions but also of effectively being unable to challenge a decision whose origin and logic are opaque to the party involved. At the same time, a centralized supervisory authority should be established to assess the suitability of algorithmic tools for use in judicial practice. This authority should possess technological, legal, and ethical expertise and be responsible for deciding whether a specific tool meets the requirements of the rule of law.

Its activities should also include conducting periodic audits, monitoring compliance with human oversight over the system, as well as investigating any complaints about rights violations resulting from the use of AI. Equally important is the question of liability. In cases where an algorithmic tool malfunction–whether due to a faulty algorithm, inappropriate data inputs, or insufficient oversight–it must be clearly established who is responsible for the outcome. The legal framework should define the liability relationship

[58] See Article 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.
[59] See ELI-UNIDROIT Rules of Civil Procedure, commentary on Rule 12, p. 56.

between the judge who decided to use the AI, the system operator (for example, the court administration), and potentially the technology creator. This liability must be transparent, clear, and understandable not only to the system actors but also to the parties involved in the proceedings.

Another distinct challenge is the education of judges and other court personnel. A judge who uses an AI tool must not only understand the law but also have at least a basic understanding of the functioning of the technologies underlying the algorithm. Only then can the judge assess whether the tool's output is reliable or should be rejected. Therefore, training in legal informatics, data analysis, and AI ethics should become an integral part of ongoing judicial education. It is also necessary to develop supporting materials, methodologies, and model cases to help judges work safely and responsibly with these tools. Ultimately, the issue is not just about introducing technology but about maintaining public trust in the judicial system.[60] If the judiciary is to fulfill its role as a guarantor of law and justice, its decisions must be not only efficient but above all human, understandable, and accountable. Artificial intelligence can be a useful tool in achieving these goals, but only if it is used as an aid rather than a replacement for judicial authority. The Czech legal system should therefore aim for a balanced model in which technology is subordinated to legal rules, not the other way around.

The Czech Republic has a unique opportunity to learn from foreign experiences and avoid mistakes already made by other jurisdictions. Inspirational examples include the Canadian model of preliminary assessment of algorithmic systems, the British rigorous implementation of the *human in the loop* principle, and the French emphasis on protecting judicial independence. Although these approaches arise from different traditions, they share the conviction that AI can serve justice only if it is evaluated not solely from the perspective of performance but also through the lenses of trust, values, and fundamental rights.

In conclusion, the implementation of artificial intelligence into judicial decision-making in the Czech Republic will require careful legislative, institutional, and value-based preparation. It is not enough to simply adopt the technology; it must be transformed to serve justice in the spirit of the democratic rule of law. If this goal is achieved, AI can become a welcomed assistant to justice. However, if these fundamental principles are compromised, there is a risk that justice will lose what makes it irreplaceable: humanity, responsibility, and trust.

[60] HRON, D. The Interface of Judicial Practice and Artificial Intelligence: Evolution and Challenges. *Bulletin advokacie*. 2024, No. 7–8, pp. 16–22.