THE FFAR’S SERVICE FEE CAPS AS A RESTRICTION OF COMPETITION BY OBJECT. IS THERE A WAY TO SAVE THEM?

Abstract

This article addresses the legal challenges surrounding the compatibility of Article 15(2) of the FIFA Football Agent Regulations (FFAR) with Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In particular, it examines whether the “Service Fee Caps” contained in Article 15(2) FFAR constitute a restriction of competition “by object”. The methodology employed combines a systematic examination of legal doctrine with a comparative evaluation of the relevant case law.
The research findings indicate that Article 15(2) FFAR constitutes a restriction of competition “by object”, given that it has the effect of substantially harming competition. The “Service Fee Caps”, set at an unreasonably low level, have the effect of distorting competition in the relevant market for football agent services by disproportionately restricting the ability of agents to negotiate fees freely. This is further compounded by FIFA’s dominant regulatory and control position and agents’ inability to avoid applying the FFAR.
The principal conclusion is that although FIFA’s regulatory intervention is justified, the “Service Fee Caps”, as currently structured, are incompatible with EU competition law. The analysis highlights the need for FIFA to reformulate its regulations in accordance with EU legal standards, ensuring proportionality and safeguarding competition while fulfilling its governance role. This article contributes to the broader discussion on the intersection of sports governance and EU law, offering insights into the delicate balance between regulatory autonomy and compliance with legal principles.