GOOD CONSEQUENCES
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Abstract
This essay considers the problem of justification of punishment. Philosophers of criminal law developed a whole range of competing theories, which answer this question by their own manner. Of course, each of these theories has its strengths and weaknesses. Traditionally, the most pronounced among these theories are two, i.e. retributivism and consequentialism. If put very simply, the consequentialist justifications (e.g. Bentham, Sidgwick) of punishment lie in the fact that punishment is only justifiable on the basis of its good consequences, while retributivist theories (e.g. Kant, Hegel) present within their mainstream an opinion that punishment is justified only when a punished person deserves it. The author argues that we need a combined theory. Normative jurisprudence should not be satisfied with simple utilitarianism (maximization of social utility), but it should tie it to deontological constraints limitations, specifically to the requirement to respect an autonomy of an individual and his personal dignity.
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